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Non-technical summary
Unfunded public pension bene¯ts have a negative impact on private savings, since individuals partially rely on these to¯nance their retirement. The size of a public pension scheme also a®ects the tax burden, since bene¯ts are typically¯nanced by levying taxes on labour (social security contributions). In addition, unfunded public pensions modify the allocation of resources between generations, since today's bene¯ts are¯nanced by current social contributions. The overall impact of such a redistributive scheme on economic activity mainly depends on individuals' reactions to taxes and bene¯ts.
Our main argument is that publicly-provided transfers between generations have an impact on private transfers between parents and children. Parents¯nance the education of their children and leave them a bequest, provided that they are su±ciently wealthy.
In poor families, however, parents leave no bequests and cannot optimally¯nance the education of their children owing to liquidity constraints. Poor parents cannot borrow to invest more in the education of their children, since they are forbidden by law to force their children to reimburse them. By transferring resources from children to parents, public intergenerational transfers alleviate such liquidity constraints, thereby increasing the level of education. This is good for growth, provided that public pensions do not o®set the favourable impact on human capital formation by crowding out savings.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the size of an unfunded public pension system and economic growth in an overlapping generation model, in which altruistic parents may a®ect the income of their children through bequests and education. Wē nd that there is no case for public pensions if transfers of both physical (bequests) and human (education) capital are operative in the family. Public pensions do not a®ect the economic equilibrium if they are¯nanced by lump-sum social contributions, but are bad for growth if they are¯nanced by distortionary taxation. In contrast, public pensions can be good for growth if parents leave no bequests. In such a situation, public pensions make parents increase their consumption and educational spending. One has then to balance the positive growth e®ects of enhanced human capital formation with the negative e®ects of lower savings and physical capital. We show that, unless individuals are su±ciently impatient, there exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system.
Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between the size of a public pension system and economic growth in an overlapping generation economy, in which altruistic parents may a®ect their children's income through education and bequests.
Individuals' reaction to¯scal policy, which determines the e®ectiveness of policy making in stimulating growth 1 , mainly depends on the span of their forecasting horizon. The current income-driven consumer of the Keynesian paradigm is typically short-sighted, which contrasts with the far-sighted Ricardian individual, who is able to see through the government's intertemporal budget constraint and to counter the e®ects of¯scal policy.
Whereas pay-as-you-go public pensions fully crowd out private savings in the textbook version of overlapping generation models 2 , where individuals' horizons are limited to their own life-cycle, successive generations of altruistic individuals are nested through a chain of bequests, thereby making¯scal policies ine®ective (Barro 1974 Regardless of bequests, signi¯cant altruistically-motivated transfers of human capital take place in the family, as children are not capable of caring for themselves or making contractual arrangements to self-¯nance education (Becker 1991 The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic model. In section 3, we study the balanced growth path, which is characterised by either operative or inoperative bequests. In section 4, we examine the growth e®ect of an increase in the scale of a public pension programme in an economy where bequests are inoperative. We set out our concluding remarks in section 5.
The Model
The basic framework is an overlapping generation model µ a la Allais (1947)-Samuelson (1958)- Diamond (1965) , in which parents are altruistically concerned for the well-being of their children. This concern is expressed by providing children with a disposable income later on in life and departs from both joy-of-giving and recursive altruism. We borrow this formulation from Becker (1991) , who points out that wealth of children differs from expenditure on children. A parent faces a trade-o® between transfers of human capital (education) and physical capital (bequests) to enhance the disposable income of his children.
Individuals
The economy consists of a sequence of individuals who live for three periods: childhood, adulthood and old-age. In the second period of their life, each individual gives birth to 1 + n children, so that the population grows at a constant rate n. In each period 9 t; a new cohort consisting of N t (= (1 + n) N t¡1 ) identical individuals is born. During childhood individuals do not make any decisions, as it is assumed that their consumption is included in their parents' consumption. They are reared by their parents, who¯nance their education. When adult, they work and receive the market wage, consume, save and rear their own children. When old, they are retired and leave a bequest x t+1 to each of their 1 + n children.
During adulthood each individual born at t ¡ 1 supplies inelastically h t e±ciency units of labour, his level of human capital depending on his parents' spending on education. In addition, each adult inherits x t from his parents so that his current income is:
where w t is the wage rate per e±ciency unit of labour. Adults distribute their income among own consumption, c t , spending on their children's education, (1 + n) e t , and savings, s t :
During old-age individuals are retired and receive the proceeds of their savings. Each individual leaves a bequest x t+1 to each of his 1 + n children. Old-age consumption is simply equal to the proceeds of savings minus bequests:
Bequests are assumed to be non-negative:
The human capital of each individual born at t, h t+1 , is a function of his parents' private educational spending, e t , and his parents' human capital, h t :
where D > 0 is a scale factor and An adult (in period t + 1) receives an income that consists of labour earnings and inheritance:
We assume that parents are altruistic towards their children and model this by making the disposable income of their adult children, ! t+1 , an argument of their utility function.
Each individual born at t ¡ 1 has the following lifetime utility function:
where 0 <¯< 1 and°> 0 is the intergenerational degree of altruism. Children are educated during chilhood (period t) and inherit during adulthood.
We now add public pension contributions and bene¯ts to an individual's budget constraints. Contributions can be levied either as lump-sum taxes (´t) or as proportional labour income taxes (¿ ), whereas public pension bene¯ts are distributed in a lump-sum way. We modify the budget constraints (1), (3) and (6) accordingly:
An individual born in period t ¡ 1 is endowed with h t units of human capital at the outset of adulthood and chooses e t , s t , c t , d t+1 , x t+1 and ! t+1 so as to maximise his life-cycle utility (7) under constraints (2), (8), (9), (4) and (10) . An individual's optimal choice is characterised by the¯rst order conditions:
If bequests are operative, the expression (13) holds with equality:
Plugging (11) and (12) into (13) gives:
The rate of return on education is greater than (or equal to) the rate of interest. The rate of return on education is modi¯ed by proportional contributions, but not by lump-sum contributions. Both rates are equal when bequests are operative. In such a case we say that private educational spending is optimal. When bequests are inoperative, the rate of return on education is strictly higher than the rate of interest and the level of private educational spending is suboptimal.
Firms
In each period t, production occurs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology using two inputs, physical capital K t and human capital H t . Output is given by:
where A > 0 is a scale parameter and ® 2 ]0; 1[ denotes the capital share. In each period the stock of capital results from individuals' savings in the preceding period. In any period t¸1 we have:
The initial stock of capital (K 0 ) is given, and belongs to the N ¡2 individuals, who are old in period 0; each of them owns
The demand for labour (human capital) maximises pro¯t:
This implies:
where k t = K t =H t is the physical to human capital ratio. Pro¯ts are rebated to capital owners, the old in period t. The return on savings is therefore given by:
Intertemporal equilibrium
The public pension scheme works as follows. The government in period t raises N t¡1 (´t + ¿ w t h t ) in contributions from the adult and rebates the revenue to the current old. Each of the N t¡2 retirees in period t receives a lump-sum bene¯t, µ t . The government's budget is balanced in each period t:
To obtain a balanced growth path (along which all individual variables grow at the same rate) we further assume that lump-sum social contributions are a fraction´2 ]0; 1[ of total labour income, w t H t :
In the remainder of this paper we refer to´+ ¿ as the public pension ratio. Given the initial capital stock, k 0 (= K 0 =N ¡2 = s ¡1 ), the initial level of human capital, h 0 , and a public pension ratio´+ ¿ , a perfect foresight intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices fc t ; d t; k t ; e t ; s t ; x t ; w t ; R t g such that individuals maximise utility, factor markets are competitive and all markets clear. The labour and the good market clear:
According to Walras' law in period t, the equilibrium of the labour market implies that of the good market. In each period we can substitute the old's budget constraint for the equilibrium condition of the good market. Using (2), the expression (22) becomes:
The intertemporal equilibrium is parameterised by the public pension ratio (´and 
Operative bequests
When bequests are operative in period t + 1; the expressions (14) and (23) give:
The non-negative bequest condition,
lower bound (Â) on the public pension ratio:
When the degree of altruism is su±ciently high, i.e.°¸1
¡® ®¯, this lower bound is negative (Â · 0) and bequests are operative, regardless of the public pension ratio. When the condition (26) is satis¯ed, (15) holds with equality. The combination of (15), (18) and (19) gives a simple expression for the educational spending per unit of human capital, e t´et =h t :
The expression (5) can be re-written as follows: h t+1 = De ± t h t , which implies together with (27) :
We also obtain simple expressions for savings (from N t¡1 s t = K t+1 ) and consumption (from (11) and (25)):
We can therefore re-write the budget constraint of an adult:
where
B (¿ ) is increasing, while (1 ¡ ¿ ) B (¿ ) is decreasing. Given stocks of physical and human capital, k t and h t , the educational spending per unit of human capital
decreases with ¿ , whereas consumption and savings, which are proportional to e t = (1 ¡ ¿ ), increase. Next period's capital stock k t+1 is proportional to e The educational spending per unit of human capital, e t , is increasing with respect to°a nd¯, as:
More altruistic parents devote more resources to the education of their children. Patience is also a positive determinant of parental spending on education.
The following proposition characterises the intertemporal equilibrium path with operative bequests and establishes that lump-sum taxation is neutral and that proportional taxation reduces the long-run growth rate.
Proposition 1 When the public pension ratio is not too low 3 ,´+ ¿¸Â, there exists a unique intertemporal equilibrium with operative bequests in each period, given initial values for physical, k 0 > 0, and human capital, h 0 > 0. This equilibrium is characterised by a sequence (k t ; e t ) de¯ned by:
This sequence converges monotonically towards a steady state (k; e) that de¯nes a balanced growth path. Along the balanced growth path, all individual variables (! t ; c t ; s t ; e t ; d t ; x t ) grow at the same rate as human capital 4 : h t+1 =h t = De ± . The intertemporal equilibrium is independent from the lump-sum contribution´, whereas the long-run growth rate decreases with the proportional contribution ¿ . 
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Proof: The condition´+ ¿¸Â guarantees that there exists a temporary equilibrium with operative bequests in each period t¸0. In the initial period t = 0; the¯rst old allocates the proceeds of his savings, R 0 s ¡1 , between old-age consumption, d 0 , and bequests, x 0 , to his 1 + n children; (24) and (25) give: (25) , (27) and (29) .
The educational spending per unit of human capital is given by:
The growth e®ect of an increase in proportional contributions can be easily obtained by studying the function
One easily sees that the derivative of this function is always negative, since for any ¿¸0:
In the long run the economy grows along a balanced growth path. All individual variables grow at the same rate h t+1 =h t = De ± ; while the capital stock, the wage rate and the rate of interest are constant.¥ Public pensions do not foster growth when intergenerational transfers of both physical and human capital are operative in the family. In the case of lump-sum contributions, public pensions are neutral. In the case of proportional contributions, an increase in the scale of a public pension system slows down growth, since taxes levied to¯nance the programme distort the educational choices of parents.
Inoperative bequests
When bequests are inoperative in period t + 1 (x t+1 = 0), (10) and (23) become:
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The educational spending per unit of human capital, e t´et =h t , satis¯es (12) . Using (11) , (34) and (35), we obtain:
This expression shows that, for k t+1 given, an increase in either proportional or lumpsum contributions enhances educational spending. On the other hand, an increase in contributions has a negative impact on k t+1 via savings. There is, therefore, the question whether unfunded public pensions speed up or slow down growth in an economy where bequests are inoperative. In this section we characterise the intertemporal equilibrium of an economy with inoperative bequests, and we come to grips with this question in the next.
We re-write the non-negative bequest condition (15) as follows:
This and (36) de¯ne an upper bound on the public pension ratio:
Bequests are inoperative when this inequality holds. Using h t+1 = De ± t h t and (36) we obtain:
We then obtain simple expressions for savings and consumption (using (11), (35) and
The budget constraint of an adult (2) becomes:
where e B (´; ¿ ) = (1 + n)
The next proposition characterises the intertemporal equilibrium of an economy with inoperative bequests.
Proposition 2 When the public pension ratio sati¯es´+ ¿ < Â, there exists a unique intertemporal equilibrium with inoperative bequests in each period, given initial values for physical capital, k 0 > 0, and human capital, h 0 > 0. This equilibrium is characterised by a sequence (k t ; e t ) de¯ned by:
This sequence converges monotonically towards a steady state (k; e) that de¯nes a balanced growth path.
The proof of proposition 2 follows the same lines as that of proposition 1.
Our main purpose is now to assess the growth e®ect of a change in the size of a public pension system when bequests are inoperative.
Public pensions and long-run growth
When bequests are operative, the intertemporal equilibrium is independent from the pub- 
To assess the growth e®ect of an increase in the public pension ratio´, one must characterise the sign of @e @´.
We pursue the study of this derivative in appendix I, where we show that @e @´h as the same sign as a function © (´) ; which decreases from In the proof of proposition 3 below, we show that the case C cannot obtain when the elasticity of the technology of education with respect to educational spending (±) is above a threshold, ± =
1¡2® 2(1¡®)
. To illustrate how the pattern of public pensions and growth depends on patience and altruism we resort to a diagrammatic representation. The e®ect of public pensions on growth depends on two key parameters characterising households' behaviours, namely¯, which represents thrift, and°, which indicates the strength of parental concern for children. Figure 1 depicts the pattern of public pensions and growth, when the elasticity of the technology of education is larger than ± =
. Figure 2 depicts this pattern in the case of a low elasticity of the technology of education (± < ±).
The three cases A, B and C are then possible, depending on the values taken by°and¯.
Insert¯gures 1 and 2 here
The main results of this section are summarised in the following proposition. 
There then exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension programme, b · Â.
When the elasticity of the technology of education with respect to educational spending is su±ciently high
, this maximum is interior (b < Â) and the growth rate decreases with the public pension ratio if the size of the system is larger than b.
Proof: The positive e®ect of public pensions on growth arises in the cases B and C.
This requires that Â > 0 and © (0) > 0, i.e.:
We have b < Â in the case B and b = Â in the case C.
Moreover, we have © (Â)¸0 in the case C, which is equivalent to:
Using this and the condition Â > 0 (,°<
we obtain:
This implies: ± < 1¡2® 2(1¡®)
= ±. The case C is therefore excluded for ± > ±.¥
In the case A, increasing the size of a public pension system bears a negative e®ect on growth, since it makes individuals save less, thereby decreasing the accumulation of physical capital and growth. This negative e®ect on growth dominates the positive e®ect on human capital formation.
In the case B, increasing the size of a public pension system has a positive e®ect on growth until the system has reached its growth-maximising size. Increasing further the size of the system has a negative impact on growth. Typically, this is an example of non-linearities in the pattern of public pensions and growth
In the case C, increasing the size of a public pension system has always a positive impact on growth until bequests become operative. Individuals must be su±ciently patient and have a degree of altruism su±ciently close to the level that would make them leave bequests (i.e.,
1¡® ®¯)
. In addition, this case is ruled out if the elasticity of the technology of education with respect to educational spending is su±ciently high. For instance, if the physical capital share is larger than 1/2, this case is excluded. For a capital share of 1/3, this case is excluded if the elasticity of the technology of education is larger than 1/4.
Proportional contributions (´=
When bequests are operative, increasing the size of a public pension system¯nanced by proportional contributions is bad for growth, since it reduces the incentives for human capital formation. By contrast, this section shows that there is a case for a public pension programme¯nanced by proportional contributions when bequests are not operative.
Bequests are inoperative as long as the tax rate does not exceed an upper bound: 
The study of the¯rst derivative of e with respect to ¿ is carried out in appendix II, where we establish that the derivative @e @¿ has the same sign as a function ª (¿ ), which decreases from 
. It is worth noting that ± 0 < ±. Another di®erence with the lumpsum case is that the frontier between C' and B' is not a line, but a curve de¯ned by ª (Â) = 0. Apart from that, the diagrammatic representation of the pattern of public pensions and growth is qualitatively similar to that obtained in the case of lump-sum social contributions.
The next proposition summarises the main results of this section. 
There then exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system (b ¿ · Â). If the elasticity of the technology of education is su±ciently high, i.e.
, this maximum is interior, (b ¿ < Â) and the growth rate decreases with the size of the system if the public pension ratio is larger than b ¿ .
Proof: The cases B' or C' arise if and only if Â > 0 and ª (0) > 0, or equivalently:
The case C' arises if and only if:
This cannot occur if ± > 1 ¡ ®.
Let us now deal with the case ± < 1 ¡ ®. If ± < 1 ¡ ®, the LHS of (43) is increasing with°. Since°<
, Â > 0), (43) implies:
ince¯< 1, this inequality further implies:
The case C' cannot therefore occur if ± > ± 0 .¥ As far as the assessment of a public pension programme is concerned, the case of proportional contributions is qualitatively similar to the case of lump-sum contributions, although there is one additional negative e®ect of public pensions on growth owing to distortionary taxation. Empirical evidence, however, is inconclusive and many researchers have suggested that there may be non-linearities in the pattern of taxation, public expenditure and growth.
Increasing public expenditure or taxes may be good for growth when starting from a low level and bad for growth when starting from a high level. Our model provides a theoretical case of non-linearities in the pattern of unfunded public pensions.
From a theoretical viewpoint, there is a case for public pensions only if individuals initially leave no bequests. When bequests are not operative, the family fails to reap the full gain of investment in human capital, which then o®ers a higher return than physical capital. Pension bene¯ts may alleviate this market failure by giving parents more resources to invest in the human capital of their children. Two opposing e®ects are nevertheless at work, since public pensions increase investment in human capital (a positive e®ect on growth) but reduce savings (a negative e®ect on growth). In an economy with inoperative bequests, an unfunded public pension system enhances growth if parents are su±ciently patient (given their degree of altruism), i.e they save enough for providinḡ nances for their old-age. A su±cient degree of patience moderates the adverse e®ect of public pensions on savings and physical capital.
References II-Proportional contributions:
To analyse the impact of an increase in the scale of public pension we study the function.
We introduce a new variable: x = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®) (1 ¡ ¿ )´x (¿ ), the range of which is h ®;+°i ; since the contribution rate vary, by assumption, between 0 and Â = 1 ¡°(
1¡®)(¯+°)
. We can then study a simpler function:
he logarithmic derivative of G has the same sign as:
The function ª (¿ )´¡ (x (¿ )) decreases from: 
